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I. INTRODUCTION
At age twenty-one, Abigail Kathleen Burroughs met a fate usually reserved for
aged men who have spent much of their lives drinking and smoking.1 Diagnosed
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with cancer at age nineteen, Abigail battled the squamous cell carcinoma that
invaded her body even as she struggled to maintain her characteristic optimism.2
Abigail struggled with more than her illness, however.3 In the last years of her
life, Abigail and her family also wrestled with Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulations that denied her access to medication that could have saved her life.4 The
policy at issue was the FDA’s practice of progressive testing, which requires that
experimental drugs pass at least three testing phases before the FDA will grant
approval for commercial marketing and public access to a drug.5 For Abigail, the
process proved too long.6 This policy denied her the experimental drug, Erbitux, a
cancer-fighting drug that Abigail’s oncologist believed had a significant chance of
saving her life.7 Despite her doctor’s dedication and her family’s continuing support,
Abigail died in 2001—just two years after being diagnosed with the fast-moving
cancer.8
Following Abigail’s death, her father, Frank Burroughs, founded the Abigail
Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Abigail Alliance)9 which has
dedicated itself to removing the “regulatory barriers currently preventing seriously ill
patients from gaining access” to potentially life-saving drugs.10 Toward that end, the
Abigail Alliance filed suit against the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services and the FDA Commissioner, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the
ban on Phase I experimental drugs11 that have been “deemed sufficiently safe for
substantial human testing, but [have] not yet proven to be safe and effective [for
commercial marketing].”12
On August 30, 2007, the D.C. Circuit dealt the Abigail Alliance a harsh blow
when it held in Abigail v. von Eschenbach that terminally ill patients, such as
Abigail, have no constitutional right of access to drugs that have not been proven

1

See Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families
Battle an Uncaring Bureaucracy, in LIFE EXTENSION 26 (Special Ed. 2007), available
at http://abigail-alliance.org/LEMSEP07pAbigailLR.pdf.
2

Id. at 26.

3

Id. at 26-28.

4

Id. at 26

5

See Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert.
denied 128 S.Ct. 1069 (2008); see also Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470,
474 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
6

See Kovach, supra note 1, at 26-27.

7

Id. at 26.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id. at 25.

11

See Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 473-474, rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.

2007).
12

See Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 473, 486 (quoting FDA counsel’s oral arguments that
“[i]t takes approximately one year to conduct Phase I testing”).

2008]

DYING TO WAIT: HOW THE ABIGAIL COURT GOT IT WRONG

55

safe and effective by the FDA.13 Consequently, seriously ill patients seeking access
to experimental drugs must either fit the FDA’s stringent qualifications for
experimental trials or wait for the drug to make its way through the FDA’s
burdensome approval process.14 For people, like Abigail, who are denied
participation in experimental studies,15 the typical seven-year wait will end in a
death made all the more bitter by the knowledge that the FDA withheld access to
potentially life-saving medications.16 That the FDA eventually approved the very
experimental drug Abigail sought to save her life must have been bitter medicine for
her friends and family.17
This paper will argue that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Abigail rested on faulty
conclusions. Specifically, the Abigail court’s cursory examination of the history of
drug18 regulation in the United States resulted in a mischaracterization of our
nation’s traditional attitude toward individual access to medicines. A close
examination of the history of pharmacology in this country reveals the true
tradition—a society accustomed to self-medicating and which implicitly assumed the
government could not interfere with its personal choice to take certain medications.19
Section II of this paper examines the holding in Abigail with reference to
Washington v. Glucksberg,20 which set out the test for determining whether a
13
See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697. The Abigail court also rejected the Abigail
Alliance’s arguments that application of the FDA policies is an intentional tort because it
prevents a third party from rendering necessary aid to terminally ill patients and furthermore
ruled that the common law doctrines of necessity and self-defense do not support the Abigail
Alliance’s claim of a fundamental right of access. Id.
14

See Kovach, supra note 1, at 27.

15

Sue Kovach writes that although the FDA was testing the efficacy of Erbitux in battling
the type of cancer cells invading Abigail’s body, the FDA denied her access to the
experimental trials because those trials were designed to treat colon cancer. See Kovach,
supra note 1, at 27. Because Abigail’s cancer was located in her head and neck, the FDA
considered her case irrelevant to the study. Id.
16

See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 698 (noting that the “testing process is an extremely
lengthy one, requiring nearly seven years for the average experimental drug”).
17

See Andrew Pollack, Court Rejects Patient Right to Use Drugs Being Tested, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A12.
18
The 1828 edition of Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language defines
“drug” as “[t]he general name of substances used in medicine, sold by the druggist, and
compounded by apothecaries and physicians; any substance, vegetable, animal or mineral,
which is used in the composition or preparation of medicines.” Webster’s 1828 Dictionary,
CORNERSTONE BAPTIST TEMPLE, http://www.cbtministries.org/resources/webster1828.htm (last
visited Nov. 30, 2007).
19
20

See infra Part III.

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). The Supreme Court in
Glucksberg stated the test thusly:
“Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed . . . . [s]econd, we have required
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particular liberty interest is fundamental. Section III reveals the long-held American
tradition of self-medication. Section IV surveys the American history of drug
regulation and analyzes the text of several state and federal laws the Abigail court
cited to support its holding. Section V proposes that application of the Glucksberg
test to this country’s long tradition of self-medication regulation renders the
conclusion that there is in the United States a fundamental right of access to
experimental drugs. Finally, Section VI concludes that courts should recognize the
Abigail Alliance’s fundamental right of access to experimental drugs.
II. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE V. VON ESCHENBACH
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes the government from
depriving persons of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”21 The
Supreme Court has held that these rights warrant “heightened protection against
governmental interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”22
Therefore, if the government impinges on fundamental rights, such as privacy,
marriage, abortion, or bodily integrity, its action must be necessary to fulfill some
compelling governmental interest.23
In Abigail, the D.C. Circuit held that terminally ill patients do not have a
fundamental right of access to potentially life-saving drugs that have not been fully
approved by the FDA.24 The Abigail court relied heavily on Washington v.
Glucksberg, which held that a right is fundamental under the due process clause if it
is “objectively, deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition…and implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.”25 The Abigail court concluded that there is no
tradition in the United States to support a right of access to drugs that have not been
proven safe.26 Instead, the court stated that this country has a long history of drug
regulation aimed at preventing access to unsafe drugs.27 Accordingly, the court
in substantive-due-process cases a careful description of the asserted fundamental
interest.”
Id. at 720-21.
21

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

22

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.

23
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891) (concluding that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law”).
24

See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697.

25

Glucksberg, 117 U.S. at 720-721 (1997). The Glucksberg test requires a showing that a
liberty interest is deeply rooted in our nation’s history and traditions, but also that the interest
is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
it were sacrificed.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. The Abigail court, however, did not reach
the second prong because it concluded that the Abigail Alliance had failed to show their
interest was deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d
at 697.
26

See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703.

27

Id.
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subjected FDA regulations prohibiting access to experimental drugs to the relatively
undemanding test of rational basis scrutiny.28 The court then concluded that FDA
regulations limiting access to experimental drugs are rationally related to the state’s
legitimate interest in protecting the public from potentially unsafe drugs whose
efficacy has not been established.29 Had the Abigail court determined that terminally
ill patients have a fundamental right of access to potentially life-saving experimental
drugs, it would have then subjected the FDA policies at issue to strict scrutiny, a
much higher constitutional standard.30
To support its conclusions, the Abigail court offered a history of drug safety
regulation dating back to 1736 and professed the existence of a long history of drug
regulation in England.31 The court’s treatment of the history, however, was cursory
and resulted in premature assumptions based on a mischaracterization of the laws it
blithely cited. The court failed to consider the vast historical material which reveals
the real tradition in this country: the individual’s unfettered choice to ingest drugs,
even those not proven safe for human consumption.32 The true American tradition is
one of self-medication, not government regulation.33
III. THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF SELF-MEDICATION
A. Self-Medication in Early America
For centuries, Americans enjoyed the right to decide how to cure themselves—a
tradition inherited from English culture.34 American colonists treasured their
medical self-help books and brought from their mother country the custom of selfmedication.35 As early as 1613, books, such as The English Housewife and the
English Husbandman, guided colonists in cultivating and administering medicinal
herbs and drugs.36 More than a century later, John Tenant of Virginia published
Everyman His Own Doctor (1734), which was translated into German and used by
common farmers throughout Pennsylvania Dutch.37
Medicinal decoctions were often administered by the earliest medical
practitioners in colonial America—British housewives.38 This American tradition is

28

Id. at 712-13.

29

Id. at 713.

30

Id. at 711.

31

Id. at 704-06.

32

See infra Part III.

33

See infra Parts III and IV.

34

See EDWARD KREMERS & GEORGE URDANG, KREMERS AND URDANG’S HISTORY
PHARMACY 153 (Glenn Sonnedecker ed., J.B. Lippincott) (4th ed. 1976).
35

Id. at 153.

36

Id.

37

See DAVID L. COWEN, PHARMACOPOEIAS
AMERICA, 1618-1847 at 269 (Ashgate 2001).
38

See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 153.

AND

RELATED LITERATURE

IN

BRITAIN

OF

AND
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reflected in Nicolas Culpeper’s The English Physician, a book published in 1652 as a
“Discourse of the Vulgar Herbs of this Nation; Containing a Compleat [sic] Method
of Physick [sic]. Whereby a man may preserve his body in Health, or Cure Himself,
being Sick, for three pence Charge with such things only as grow in England, they
being most fit for English bodies.”39
The English settlers took advantage of their opportunity to experiment in their
New World, a land that rendered new and diverse flora with immense curative
potential.40 Colonists learned to grow plants and indigenous herbs, and experimented
with treatments learned from Native Americans41 despite repeated admonitions from
medical doctors, who warned against the dangers of unknown therapies.42 For
example, in his Centennial Address to the Massachusetts Medical Society in 1881,
Dr. Samuel Abbott Green warned colleagues about the medical treatments colonists
sought from Native Americans:
The Indians had no knowledge of medicine, but were accustomed to treat
disease largely by incantations and powwows. There is, however, a
popular belief to-day that the Indian doctor is skilled in botanical
remedies, as he is wont to use the infusions and decoctions of various
roots and herbs. While there is no ground for such an impression, he will
yet be consulted as long as the race of simpletons continues to exist—
perhaps to the millennium. The ravages of small-pox among the ignorant
natives were fearful, as they had no knowledge of inoculation or
vaccination; and thus a new danger opposed the white settlers, who were
already overburdened by their cares and trials.43

39
Quoted in George E. Osborne, Pharmacy in British Colonial America, in AMERICAN
PHARMACY IN THE COLONIAL REVOLUTIONARY PERIODS: A BICENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM
SPONSORED BY THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF THE HISTORY OF PHARMACY WITH THE COSPONSORSHIP OF THE AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION AND THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF HOSPITAL PHARMACISTS, NEW ORLEANS, APRIL, 1976 at 8 (George A. Bender and John
Parascandola, eds., American Inst. of the History of Pharmacy 1977).
40

See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 146-47.

41

Colonists’ use of Native American drugs was extensive. See COLIN G. CALLOWAY,
NEW WORLDS FOR ALL: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE REMAKING OF EARLY AMERICA 26-33
(Johns Hopkins 1997). In fact, about 170 drugs used by Native Americans in North and South
America were included in the United States Pharmacopoeia or the National Formulary. See
KREMERS, supra note 34, at 147. These two sources became the official standard used under
the Federal Food and Drug Administration Act passed in 1906. See Glenn Sonnedecker, Drug
Standards Become Official, in THE EARLY YEARS OF FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUG CONTROL 2830 (Glenn Sonnedecker ed., Am. Inst. of the History of Pharmacy 1982).
42

See SAMUEL ABBOTT GREEN, HISTORY OF MEDICINE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A CENTENNIAL
ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE MASSACHUSETTS MEDICAL SOCIETY AT CAMBRIDGE 13 (A.
Williams and Co. 1881). Native Americans employed extensive knowledge of the healing
properties of plants. They used leaves, roots, and bark to develop powerful remedies, many of
which colonists consumed without ever discovering the secret to their curative powers. See
CALLOWAY, supra note 41, at 26-27.
43

GREEN, supra note 42, at 13 (emphasis added).
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Dr. Green’s words reflect Americans’ faith in Native American medicine and the
great extent to which early settlers relied on Native American treatments, despite
medical officials’ recriminations against such practices. That Dr. Green delivered
this speech to the Massachusetts Medical society suggests that the medical
establishment viewed Indian medicine as little more than attempts to heal by
ceremony, incantation, and magic.
There seems to have been no consensus on this point among medical
professionals. In colonial Virginia, for example, many English physicians and
apothecaries dispatched their apprentices into the woods in search of herbal
remedies.44 Furthermore, the above excerpt reflects a determination among medical
professionals to maintain their preeminence as doctors among a community of
Americans accustomed to exercise what they had come to view as their right to selfmedication.45
Nevertheless, colonists’ use of Native American drugs was extensive.46 Many
colonists, in fact, had great faith in the Native Americans’ extensive knowledge of
the healing properties of plants, and they consumed drugs47 that Indian doctors
decocted from leaves, roots, and bark, often without ever discovering the curative
powers of these drugs.48 Caught between official recriminations, such as those by
Dr. Green,49 and convictions held by those doctors who sought to replicate Indian
remedies, many colonists chose to relieve their ills with Indian drugs, even though
they often knew nothing about the nature of such medicines.50 That government did
not interfere with such decisions reflects how English tradition, the New World
experience, and frontier living all combined to strengthen the American tradition of
self-medication.51
The strength of this tradition, coupled with an increase in population, created a
boom in the number of apothecary shops and drugstores that sold drugs to colonists
44

See CALLOWAY, supra note 41, at 30-31.

45

See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 159 (positing that London physicians sought to curb the
ambitions of apothecaries, who also dispensed drugs to the public); see also text infra
accompanying notes 80-83.
46

See CALLOWAY, supra note 41, at 30-31.

47

Although native treatments were decocted from plants, they were nonetheless drugs. In
fact, the House Report on the Import Drug Act of 1848 specifically refers to plant derivatives
as drugs. See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664. The Report refers to columbo and gentian roots as
“important crude drugs” and enumerates plant derivatives, such as rhubarb root, jalap root, and
sarsaparilla root, under the rubric of “some of the more important drugs.” Id. at 4, 9.
According to the report, Jalap root and Peruvian bark were “capital” medicines. Id. at 32, 29.
Peruvian bark was used for quinine, which became an important drug for soldiers fighting in
such wars as the American Revolution. See George B. Griffenhagen, Medicines in the
American Revolution, in AMERICAN PHARMACY IN THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY
PERIODS 27 (George A. Bender & John Parascandola ed., American Institute of the History of
Pharm. 1976).
48

See CALLOWAY, supra note 41, at 26-27.

49

See GREEN, supra note 42, at 13.

50

See CALLOWAY, supra note 41, at 26-27.

51

See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 213.
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over the counter.52 The increase led Dr. William Douglass to remark in 1722 that
“[w]e abound with Practitioners, though no other graduate than myself, we have
fourteen Apothecary shops in Boston; all our Practitioners dispense their own
medicines.”53 Whether run by physicians, pharmacists, apothecaries, or selfdescribed purveyors of good health, these shops and drugstores dispensed myriad
drugs, chemicals, and medicines directly to eager colonists.54 In fact, in 1729 the
revered Benjamin Franklin advertised in his Pennsylvania Gazette that his own store
offered “powdered mustard, linseed oil, patent medicines and ‘seneca rattlesnake
root, with directions how to use it in pleurisy.’”55 Like many drug dispensers, it is
unlikely that Franklin sold his wares by prescription to a community of colonists
accustomed to self-medicating.56
B. The Patent Medicine Boom
In the 1750s, English patent medicines57 appeared in the colonies, and colonists
began to dose themselves with large quantities of these “secret” medicines.58
According to James Harvey Young, “Americans dosed themselves with galenicals
and chymicals [sic], and swallowed complicated concoctions containing disgusting
ingredients, in their efforts to drive away the ills” that afflicted them.59 Known as
“secret remedies” since the sixteenth century, patent medicines were concocted by
anyone with a quest for knowledge and a bit of motivation.60 Because the ingredients
were secret, the patents issued covered only the shape of the bottles—not the
contents,61 a policy that makes sense given that nobody really knew what was in

52

Id. at 155-57.

53

Id. at 156.

54

Id. at 157.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

English patent medicines date back to the 1630s. The patent was a royal endowment
given to makers of medicinal remedies that had become popular for their healing properties.
Typically concocted from a multitude of unknown ingredients, patent medicines were
marketed as cures for a wide variety of ailments. Eventually, the term “patent medicine” came
to refer to any secret nostrum (patented or not) marketed as miracle remedies. See generally
GEORGE B. GRIFFENHAGEN & JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, Old English Patent Medicines in
America, in CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE MUSEUM OF HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY, PAPERS 1-11,
155 (Ernest E. Biebighauser ed., Smithsonian 1959).
58

See JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
PATENT MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 9, 67 (Princeton Univ. Press.
1961).
59

Id. at 8.

60

See Michael H. Jepson, From Secret Remedies to Prescription Medicines: A Brief
History of Medicine, in MAKING MEDICINES: A BRIEF HISTORY OF PHARMACY AND
PHARMACEUTICALS 224-26 (Stuart Anderson ed., Pharmaceutical Press 2005).
61

See YOUNG, supra note 58, at 40.
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them. Thus, although the “ingredients might vary…,” the bottles were all shaped the
same.62
Countless advertisements testify to the wide acceptance and use of such
medicines in American history.63 By the time of the American Revolution,
Americans had grown dependent on English patent medicines.64 Because of nonimportation policies during the war, English patent medicines had grown scarce, and
Americans turned toward domestic production, which later boomed during the Civil
War.65 Americans replicated the English brands and packaged them inside the
English bottles to give them the appearance of authenticity.66 Although American
patent medicines contained any number of ingredients, American consumers
continued to purchase the “English” patent medicines because they recognized the
bottles of their favorite brands.67 In fact, the ability to market the medicines seems to
have depended solely on the availability of authentic English bottles.68 In short, it
appears Americans continued to buy medicines concocted by their enterprising
fellow citizens merely because they had grown to trust the bottles, not the
ingredients.
The popularity of English patent medicines decreased dramatically by the end of
the American Revolution.69 This shift was not, however, due to Americans’ distaste
for such medicines, but occurred because the domestic patent medicine industry had
grown during the war and eventually supplanted its English antecedent.70 The
American patent medicine industry was then poised to reap huge potential benefits
presented by a domestic market.

62

Id. at 12.

63

James Harvey Young states:
Quackery was flagrant and brazen. No disease, however dire, if one believed
advertising, could resist the potency of the promoter’s product. Harper’s Weekly
possessed for its day a very large circulation and was considered one of the best
advertising media in the nation. In leafing through the volume for 1876, the nation’s
centennial year, I found in this most respectable publication promises for the certain
cure of asthma, cancer, cholera, consumption, diabetes, diphtheria, epilepsy,
rheumatism, gout, nervous ailments, and opium addiction. Although Harper’s Weekly
was too genteel to accept abortifacient advertisements or promises to restore the
prolapsed uterus or explicit cures for venereal disease and lost manhood, these bold
claims could be found in other standard journals, including the religious press. In
1900 patent medicines stood as top category in money spent for national advertising.
JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, AMERICAN HEALTH QUACKERY: COLLECTED ESSAYS 91-92 (Princeton
Univ. Press 1992).
64

See YOUNG, supra note 58, at 14.

65

Id. at 14-15, 93-110.

66

Id. at 14-15.

67

Id. at 14-15.

68

Id. at 14-15.

69

Id. at 15.

70

Id.
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During the Civil War era, the domestic patent medicine industry grew to
extraordinary heights.71 Furthermore, Congress seemingly recognized the American
culture of self-medication when in 1861 it taxed patent medicines for the purpose of
raising revenue for the impending war.72 By 1905, one estimate put the number of
patented medicines manufactured and sold in the U.S. at 28,000; the following year,
a witness before Congress estimated that there were then 50,000.73
Despite their immense popularity, patent medicines came under attack by
American doctors.74 In 1827, New York City created a “Committee of Quack
Remedies” to condemn the practice of quackery,75 and the following year a New
York State medical society adopted its official opposition to patent medicines
because it considered such medications anathema to the practice of medicine.76 Yet
the doctors did not rail against the manufacturing and sale of patent medicines in
general but against their sale and use by non-physicians.77 In fact, the New York
City committee feared that allowing medical pretenders to sell patent medicines
would lead to the degradation of the medical profession.78 Referring to what it called
“pretending empiric[s]” who sold such medicines, the committee report stated that
“their partial successes will confer upon their order, an importance and character
that could not be otherwise obtained, to the serious detriment of the healing art.”79
Thus, it appears that the committee physicians, like those who fulminated against the
use of Indian drugs, feared both the failures and the successes that resulted from the
use of patent medicines.
Like doctors who had railed against the use of Native American drugs, physicians
across the country admonished Americans against the use of patent medicines and

71

Id. at 93-110.

72

Id. at 107.

73

Id. at 109.

74

Id. at 63-67.

75
The 1828 edition of Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language defines
“quackery” as “[t]he boastful pretensions or mean practice of an ignoramus, particularly in
medicine.”
Webster’s
1828
Dictionary,
CORNERSTONE BAPTIST TEMPLE,
http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/search/word,quackery (last visited Jan. 27, 2009); see also Peter
M. Worling, Pharmacy in the Early Modern World, 1617 to 1841 AD, in MAKING MEDICINES:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PHARMACY AND PHARMACEUTICALS 60 (Stuart Anderson ed.,
Pharmaceutical Press 2005).
76

YOUNG, supra note 58, at 66.

77

Id. at 63-64.

78

Id. at 63, 73. Physicians certainly pushed for the labeling of ingredients on patent
medicines, an action which suggests that doctors feared patients would be harmed by unknown
ingredients. Yet doctors were particularly concerned that Americans viewed patent salesmen
as empiricists, practitioners who claim no scientific knowledge. By being forced to divulge
ingredients, patent medicine manufacturers could make no claims of mystical knowledge or
powers available only to them. They thus would be stripped of any enigmatic or mysterious
pretensions, which doctors believed added to the popularity of their medicines. Id. at 63, 73.
79

YOUNG, supra note 58, at 63-64 (emphasis added).

2008]

DYING TO WAIT: HOW THE ABIGAIL COURT GOT IT WRONG

63

pushed for legislation to ban their sale.80 They often warned Americans that buying
medicines from unlicensed professionals was like employing “a blacksmith to repair
a watch, a barber to shoe a horse, a ship-carpenter to make bonnets, or a milliner to
build a church.”81 Meanwhile, others accused Congress of licensing the sale of
patent medicines.82 Such legislative inaction, one doctor said in 1849, allowed
deceitful men to prey on the American public.83 Yet despite the efforts made by the
medical establishment, Congress did nothing to regulate the inherent safety of drugs
until well into the twentieth century.84
Very real dangers certainly attended the consumption of patent medicines
generally.85 For example, a patent medicine caused the death of a young girl in
1805.86 In addition, patent medicines often merely offered false and fleeting hope to
patients who experienced temporary relief from those containing pain-numbing
opiates.87 Nonetheless, Americans eagerly consumed patent medicines containing
such narcotics.
C. Americans and “Illicit” Drugs
Patent medicines containing opium were readily available. Sold under such
innocuous names as “Mrs. Winslow’s Soothing Syrup” and “McMunn’s Elixir of
Opium,” these drugs were widely marketed as treatments for dysentery, diarrhea, and
“women’s trouble.”88 Moreover, Americans considered opiate patent medicines so
versatile that many mothers even used them to quiet teething babies.89 In fact, patent
medicine advertisements, which became ubiquitous,90 proclaimed that these

80

Id. at 71-72.

81

Id. at 72.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

See infra Part IV.

85

See YOUNG, supra note 58, at 69-71.

86

Id. at 83.

87

YOUNG, supra note 58, at 71. This danger was particularly acute when the illness was
grave and time was of the essence. One critic described a hypothetical young man who upon
discovering he has the initial symptoms of a dreadful disease, buys a patent medicine
advertised as a cure: “His heart is cheered, his fears are in a measure dispelled, and with
eagerness he procures and takes the medicine.” Id. (quoting 1809 address by Nicholas
Romayne). Because, the critic continued, the medicine contains stimulants, he feels better, but
then the disease progresses rapidly beyond cure and “with four-fold rapidity the poor victim is
hurried into eternity.” Id.
88
Edward M. Brecher, Nineteenth-Century America: A Dope Fiend’s Paradise, SHAFFER
LIBRARY OF DRUG POLICY: THE CONSUMER UNION REPORT ON LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS (1972),
http://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/library/studies/cu/cu1.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
89

Id.

90

See YOUNG, supra note 58, at 104.
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medicines could cure anything from anxiety to marital problems.91 Ultimately,
however, these medicines were a legal supply of a narcotic which was readily
accessible at the cost of a bottled concoction.92
Patent medicines were not the sole legal source of opium.93 By 1800, opium had
become widely available in the U.S. and was a common ingredient even in
prescription drugs.94 Many doctors extolled the soothing, sedative effects of opium,
which most doctors believed outweighed any potential harmful effects.95 In fact,
many physicians referred to opium as “G.O.M.”—“god’s own medicine”—not only
because they allowed the patient to sleep during surgery96 but also because it could
be decocted into morphine and heroin—potent painkillers that could be used for a
range of illnesses and ailments.97
Morphine gained avid support among Americans after it was derived from opium
in 1804.98 Legally manufactured in the United States, morphine became a common
ingredient in patent medicines, and its use soared during the 1870s. This marked
increase in morphine use was due in great part to the invention of the hypodermic
needle which greatly facilitated its consumption.99 The proliferation of patent
medicines and the wide acceptance of morphine to treat soldiers in the Civil War
also added substantially to the drug’s popularity. In 1874, heroin was decocted from
morphine and was eventually sold as “The Sedative for Coughs” by Bayer
Pharmaceuticals in 1898.100 Ironically, doctors prescribed heroin to wean morphine
addicts off the drug, but they also used heroin to treat the great number of patients
who suffered from pulmonary disorders, such as pneumonia and tuberculosis.101
Cocaine, too, became a common ingredient in patent medicines.102 First derived
from the coca plant in 1844, cocaine became a common beverage ingredient
throughout Europe and North America, the most recognizable of which was CocaCola. Many Americans consumed the drug to alleviate depression, treat morphine
91

See Elaine Casey, History of Drug Use and Drugs User in the United States, SCHAEFFER
LIBRARY OF DRUG POLICY, Nov. 1978, http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/
CASEY1.htm.
92

Id.

93

See Drugs and the Drug Laws: Historical and Cultural Contexts, KING COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION DRUG POLICY PROJECT 6 (Jan. 19, 2005), http://www.kcba.org/Script
Content/KCBA/druglaw/proposal/report_hc.pdf.
94

Id.

95

Id.

96

1 VIDEOTAPE: HOOKED: ILLEGAL DRUGS AND HOW THEY GOT THAT WAY (Tera Media
for the History Channel 2000) (on file with Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Library).
97

Id.

98

See Drugs and the Drug Laws, supra note 93, at 6-7.

99

Id. at 6-7.

100

Id. at 7

101

Id.

102

See HOOKED, supra note 96.

2008]

DYING TO WAIT: HOW THE ABIGAIL COURT GOT IT WRONG

65

addiction, or merely to stimulate themselves.103 Endorsed by the Surgeon-General of
the U.S. Army for its medical properties, cocaine gained great popularity at the turn
of the twentieth century when it became a common ingredient in tonics marketed to
treat various respiratory illnesses and to overcome exhaustion and fatigue.104
Altogether, Americans liberally consumed opiates, cocaine, and marijuana through
the beginning of the twentieth century, and through the 1920s, doctors continued to
prescribe heroin extensively.105
Despite their popularity, opiates, cocaine, and marijuana did not gain complete
social or medical acceptance.106 Opiates in particular were not considered
respectable and in some cases their use was thought immoral.107 Many civic and
religious leaders joined doctors to warn Americans of their potentially harmful
effects.108 Together, they preached moderation or espoused government control.109
Yet despite warnings about the drugs’ potentially harmful effects and their powerful
addictive properties, there was scarcely any popular support for banning or even
regulating them.110 Indeed, Americans legally engaged in large-scale, non-prescribed
cannabis, cocaine and opium consumption well into the twentieth century.111
Like Native American drugs and patent medicines in general, opiates came under
fire from those warning of the dangers they posed to human health.112 Yet
Americans continued to use drugs from all these classes.113 The strength of this
continued tradition lay in the potent contemporary institution of American
individualism, an institution summarized by a New York doctor, who in 1856
lamented but accurately described the popular understanding of the time, stating,
“The people regard it among their vested interests…to buy and swallow such
physick [sic] as they in their sovereign will and pleasure shall determine; and in this
free country, the democracy denounce all restrictions [on self-medication].”114 This
103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

See Drugs and the Drug Laws, supra note 93, at 8.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id.

110

See Brecher, supra note 88.

111

HOOKED, supra note 96. The federal Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 levied a tax on the
importation, sale, and handling of cannabis. The Act required tax stamps for these activities,
but the government had printed only a nominal amount of stamps. Id. Although the Act did
not prohibit the sale or possession of marijuana, the act established government’s authority
over the regulation of “illicit” drugs. Id. The Harrison Act of 1914 taxed opium and cocaine
to the point where it was available only for medicinal use. See Drugs and the Drug Laws,
supra note 74, at 19, 25.
112

See YOUNG, supra note 57, at 71.

113

See HOOKED, supra note 96.

114

YOUNG, supra note 58, at 52. According to Young, many doctors believed that
American democracy and individualism had grown excessive and become misdirected. Id.
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sentiment was echoed with passion by a New York Senator who, reacting
sympathetically to a wheelbarrow full of signatures written on a petition115 that
extended thirty-one yards, declared that “[t]he people of this state have been bled
long enough in their bodies and pockets…and it [is] time they should do as the men
of the Revolution did: resolve to set down and enjoy the freedom for which they
bled.”116 In short, it seems Americans had come to view the democratization
embodied in the Spirit of ’76 as encompassing individual personal choices. Among
such choices was the right to self-medication.
Although the government has rightly prohibited the use of certain drugs deemed
harmful to health and society, our nation’s history of marijuana, cocaine, and
narcotics consumption epitomizes the American tradition of self-medication. For
much of the nineteenth century, physicians, pharmacies, drugstores, groceries, and
general stores all sold opiates legally and conveniently.117 Many Americans even
bought opiates by mail-order,118 a testament to the permissive government attitude
toward drug regulation. Until well into the twentieth century, self-indulgent
Americans dosed themselves on these drugs119 just as much as they did on
compounded medicines that were dispensed freely and sold to eager Americans.120
To be sure, the government’s historically permissive approach to such drugs does
not suggest that it should recognize Americans’ absolute right to ingest them.
However, its laissez-faire approach does indicate that government has long
recognized and accepted the citizenry’s choice in ingesting drugs generally.
IV. THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE DRUG REGULATION
A. Consumer Protection in Early America
Government’s laissez-faire approach to drug regulation further testifies to the
American tradition of self-medication, despite that the American tradition of selfmedication certainly bred countless pseudo-healers.121 An Ohio editor lamented the
Rather than merely advocating political and social democracy, Americans were turning toward
a self-destructive form of individualism—within which harm or death could result as the price
of individual choice. Id.
115
Id. at 55. Although the petition was directed to the New York legislature and had the
limited purpose of repealing laws criminalizing the practice of Thompsonian medicine, the
tone of the petition and the senator’s response are indicative of contemporary popular
sentiment. According to James Harvey Young, “[m]edical democracy, indeed, was what
Americans seemed to desire.” Id. Furthermore, Thompsonian medicine “was the ultimate in
the democratic approach to health” because it required no doctors and it left the choice of
therapy completely to the patient. Id. at 54.
116

Id at 55.

117

See HOOKED, supra note 96.

118

See Brecher, supra note 88.

119

See generally Casey, supra note 91.

120

See YOUNG, supra note 58, at 56.

121

See YOUNG, supra note 63, at 44; see also Worling, supra note 75, at 60 (noting that
poor, naive people seeking cures were regularly targeted by traveling salesmen who advertised
panaceas that often had little or no remedial powers).
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ease with which Americans could make such concoctions in the mid-nineteenth
century.122 He described how the average person could easily get into the business of
selling drugs:
[A]ny idle mechanic by chance gets a dispensatory, or some old receipt
book, and poring over it, or having it read to him…, he finds that mercury
is good for the itch, and old ulsers [sic]; that opium will give ease; and
that a glass of antimony will vomit. Down goes the hammer, or saw,
razor, awl, or shutter—and away to make electuaries, tinctures, elixirs,
pills, plasters and poultices.123
Yet government generally did little, if anything, to ensure that citizens would not
be harmed by unsafe or ineffective medicines.124
Before 1865, free competition and the honor system regulated drug safety.125
Early British settlers and nineteenth-century Americans believed the pharmaceutical
profession bore the sole responsibility for ensuring the purity of drugs.126 According
to FDA historian Wallace F. Janssen, the enormous popularity of patent medicines
reflected contemporary “public acceptance of the doctrine that the buyer could and
should look out for himself.”127 This view likely sprung directly from the economic
climate of the day, which emphasized laissez-faire capitalism and individualism.128
Such opposition to drug legislation may be gleaned from the words of a Georgia
Congressman, who drolly remarked that “[t]he Federal Government was not created
for the purpose of cutting your toe nails or corns.”129 While whimsical, his words
reflect the popular sentiment that consumers would be protected by economic
competition and freedom of enterprise, not by the intervention of government
regulation.
Comprehensive legislation governing specific pharmaceutical activities did not
become common in the United States until after 1870.130 Before then, American
122

See YOUNG, supra note 58, at 41.

123

Id.

124

See text infra accompanying notes 122-243.

125

See Glenn Sonnedecker, Contribution of the Pharmaceutical Profession Toward
Controlling the Quality of Drugs in the Nineteenth Century, in SAFEGUARDING THE PUBLIC:
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF MEDICINAL DRUG CONTROL 97 (John B. Blake ed., Johns Hopkins
Press 1970).
126

See Wesley J. Heath, America’s First Drug Regulation Regime: The Rise and Fall of
the Import Drug Act of 1848, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 170 (2004).
127
Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels: 1906 Food and Drugs
Act, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/history1.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2007).
128

See Social Darwinism and American Laissez-Faire Capitalism, CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS FOUNDATION, http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-19-2-b.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2009).
129

JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, AMERICAN SELF-DOSAGE MEDICINES: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 5 (Coronado Press, 1974).
130

See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 213.
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ideology borne of democratic and laissez-faire economic principles combined with
frontier living to preempt the development of comprehensive drug regulation.131 The
United States does, however, have a long history of drug regulation aimed at
protecting consumers from fraud or misrepresentation.132 Such regulations were
intended to regulate the efficacy of drugs in order to ensure that unsuspecting
Americans did not purchase drugs that came with false assurances.133 In fact, most
colonial regulation involved the structuring of fees,134 not denial of access to
potentially unsafe drugs.135 In brief, most laws were designed to prevent quackery
and the exorbitant fees136 associated with that dubious though lucrative vocation.137
This American tradition of protecting consumer confidence dates back to 1630
when Massachusetts Bay Colony authorities fined or whipped one Nicholas Knopp
for “vending as a cure for scurvy ‘a water of no worth nor value,’ which he ‘solde att
a very deare rate [sic].’”138 The Massachusetts authorities were concerned that
purveyors of drugs were deceiving colonists into paying high prices for drugs of “no
worth nor value.”139 As the Abigail court noted in a footnote, Knopp’s punishment
was not an example of government regulation in the modern sense.140 Yet the court
failed to recognize that the incident reflects the importance that early Americans
placed on protecting the confidence and pocketbooks of consumers who sought to
self-medicate—a tradition Americans would carry into the twentieth century.141
Colonies, and later states, certainly have a history of regulating drugs, but such
regulations reflect the community’s desire to condemn frauds, such as Knopp’s in
Massachusetts.142 Rather than recognize that Knopp’s punishment reflected
consumerist principles, the Abigail court cited the case to add flavor, credibility, and
a sense of pedigree to what it viewed as a long-standing tradition of drug regulation
in this country. Drug regulation certainly extends as far back as 1630 when Knopp
was made to pay for his deception, but it is not a tradition of regulating the safety of
drugs. History bears this out.
131

Id.

132

See LESLIE G. MATTHEWS, HISTORY OF PHARMACY IN BRITAIN 358 (E & S Livingstone
Ltd. 1962). In 1604, James I of England issued an act designed to prevent fraud and the
deceitful sale of adulterated hops, which foreign suppliers were apparently adulterating with a
variety of plant matter. Id.
133

See infra text accompanying notes 135-243.

134

See HAROLD B. GILL, JR., THE APOTHECARY IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 23 (Univ. Press of
Virginia 1972).
135

See infra text accompanying notes 140-243.
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Id.

137

See Worling, supra note 75, at 60.
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YOUNG, supra note 58, at 16-17.
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Id.
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See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704.
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See infra text accompanying notes 122-243.
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Id.
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B. State Regulations
1. The Virginia Act of 1736
The Abigail court began its examination of history by stating that “[d]rug
regulation in the United States began when the Colony of Virginia’s legislature
passed an act in 1736 that addressed the dispensing of more drugs than was
‘necessary or useful’ because that practice had become ‘dangerous and
intolerable.’”143 These words certainly convey alarm, but such alarm could result
only from a gross mischaracterization of the act, which in fact merely arranged a fee
structure for the sale of drugs by surgeons and apothecaries.144
The Abigail court cited the words “necessary and useful” out of context.145 The
1736 statute reveals that the Virginia House of Burgesses merely sought to prevent
surgeons and apothecaries from “padding” their bills.146 Rather than regulate drug
143

Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703-04.

144

See WYNDHAM H. BLANTON, MEDICINE IN VIRGINIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 399,
400 (Garrett & Massie 1931).
145

Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703-04.

146

See Hening: Statutes at Large, v. 4, 507-10, quoted in BLANTON, supra, note 144, at
399-400. The statute states in pertinent part:
I. WHEREAS the practice of phisic [sic] in this colony, is most commonly taken up
and followed, by surgeons, apothecaries, or such as have only served apprenticeships
to those trades, who often prove very unskilful [sic] in the art of a phisician [sic]; and
yet do demand excessive fees and exact unreasonable prices for the medicines which
they administer, and do too often, for the sake of making up long and expensive bills,
load their patients with greater quantities thereof, than are necessary or useful,
concealing all their compositions, as well to prevent the discovery of their practice, as
of the true value of what they administer: which is become a grievance, dangerous
and intolerable, as well to the poorer sort of people, as others, & doth require the most
effectual remedy that the nature of the thing will admit (emphases added).
II. Be it therefore enacted…[that] no practicer [sic] in phisic [sic], in any action or suit
whatsoever, hereafter to be commenced in any court in this colony, shall recover, for
visiting any sick person, more than the rates hereafter to be commenced in any court
of record in this colony, shall recover, for visiting any sick person, more than the rates
hereafter mentioned: that is to say….
III. And to the end the true value of the medicines administered by any practicer [sic]
in phisic [sic], may be better known, and judged of, Be it further enacted, by the
authority aforesaid, That whenever any pills, bolus, portion, draught, electuary,
decoction, or any medicines, in any form whatsoever, shall be administered to any sick
person, the person administring [sic] the same shall, at the same time, deliver his bill,
expressing every particular thing made up therein; or if the medicine administred [sic]
be a simple, or compound, directed in the dispensatories, the true name thereof shall
be expressed in the same bill, together with the quantities and prices, in both cases.
And in failure thereof, such practicer [sic], or any apothecary, making up the
prescription of another, shall be nonsuited, in any action or suit hereafter commenced,
which shall be grounded upon such bill or bills: Nor shall any book, or account, of any
practicer [sic] in phisic [sic ]or any apothecary, be permitted to be given in evidence,
before a court; unless the articles therein contained, be charged according to the
directions of this act.
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safety, the Burgesses were seeking to regulate pharmacy professionals who “for the
sake of making up long and expensive bills, load their patients with greater quantities
thereof, than are necessary and useful, concealing all their compositions, as well to
prevent the discovery of their practice, as of the true value of what they
administer.”147 More importantly, the words “dangerous and intolerable” referred
only to the fact that this practice of padding had “become a grievance, dangerous
and intolerable, as well to the poorer sort of people, and others”—their customers.148
By citing each phrase out of context and binding them together, the Abigail court
conveyed the false impression that the Virginia legislature designed the act to
regulate the sale of dangerous drugs, when in fact it merely sought to prevent the
practice by which surgeons and apothecaries “padded” their bills by prescribing
superfluous drugs to unsuspecting consumers.149
Rather than a law designed to protect patients by promoting the safety of drugs,
the 1736 legislation was designed to protect consumers from having to pay excessive
fees150 for the medicines they used in their self-medication regimes.151 Specifically,
the law was created to ensure that those who had served only as apprentices would
receive a lower rate of remuneration for their services,152 but its broader purpose was
consumer protection.153 In effect, the Virginia Act protected the consumer by setting
fees for practitioners according to their level of education and training.154 Although
the law also provided that practitioners itemize all ingredients in the drugs they
sold,155 it appears the provision was intended to ensure that consumers knew the
potency of the drugs they were buying. Whether or not to purchase particular drugs
would have remained the consumer’s choice.
The Virginia Act was not a mechanism to prohibit unlicensed persons from
dispensing drugs.156 Indeed, the Act does not refer to licensing, but sets out a
scheme by which educated dispensers could charge for their products.157 The law’s
title, which the Abigail court omitted, was “An Act for regulating the Fees and
IV. And be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, That this act shall continue
and be in force, for and during two years, next after the passing thereof, and from
thence to end of the next session of assembly.
Id. (emphases in the original unless otherwise stated)
147

BLANTON, supra note 144, at 399-400 (emphasis added).

148

Id. at 399-400 (emphases added).

149

See id. at 399 (stating that by passing the Virginia Act, the House of Burgesses “sought
to remedy the abuses of excessive fees and ‘unreasonable prices’ for medicines”).
150

See BLANTON, supra note 144, at 399.
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See supra Part III.
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See BLANTON, supra note 144, at 399.
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Id.
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Id.; see also KREMERS, supra note 34, at 159 (stating that the act deprecated the
abilities of apprentices).
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See supra note 146.
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Id.
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Id.
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Accounts of the Practicers in Phisic [sic].”158 The title reflects the import of the law,
which did not bar anyone not trained in pharmacy from continuing to concoct and
dispense drugs in Virginia yet made it illegal for professionals to demand more than
the value of their products.159 To be sure, average Virginians and their colonial
brothers continued to enjoy their notoriety for their ability to treat illness.160 In short,
although the Abigail court cited the Virginia Act as proof of government’s dedication
to regulating drug safety,161 the 1736 law is better characterized as legislation
designed to protect consumers from unscrupulous peddlers seeking to secure
unreasonable fees for drugs. As such, its citation lends little support to the court’s
holding in Abigail. Of note, the Virginia Act expired just two years after it was
passed,162 and similar bills were defeated in 1748, 1761, and 1762.163
2. The New Orleans Act of 1808
The Abigail court also relied on a law passed in the Territory of Orleans,
Louisiana in 1808.164 The court noted that the law, known as the “New Orleans
158

BLANTON, supra note 144, at 399.

159

See supra note 146.

160

See GILL, supra note 134, at 23. On May 12, 1978, the Virginia Gazette reported that a
woman, Constant Woodson, claimed she could cure cancer and even received acclaim from
newspapers and physicians. Id. Also, the House of Burgesses voted to use 100 pounds in
public funds to pay Mrs. Mary Johnson, who had offered to divulge to the public her cure for
cancer—in exchange for a reward. The Virginia Almanac published her remedy in 1754. Id.;
see also BLANTON, supra note 144, at 33 (describing how throughout the eighteenth century
“the drug business [in Virginia] was actively conducted by physicians in their own shops as
well as by those who combined the sale of drugs with that of other commodities.”).
161

See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703-04.

162

See GILL, supra note 134, at 26.

163

See BLANTON, supra note 144, at 400.

164

See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704. The statute states in pertinent part:
An Act Concerning Physicians, Surgeons and Apothecaries—

BE it enacted . . . That no person shall presume to practice, in the Territory of Orleans, as
physician, surgeon or apothecary, without first exhibiting satisfactory proof of his having
qualified himself as such, by previous studies, which shall be made to appear by a diploma of
any university or school in which he may have pursued his studies. The candidate shall
exhibit said diploma to the Mayor of the City of New-Orleans, who shall fix on a day, and
shall appoint four physicians or surgeons from among the oldest practitioners, whose duty it
shall be publicly to examine the candidate, and to give him a certificate of admission, if he
should be admitted; which certificate shall be signed by the four examiners, and by the Mayor,
who shall cause the seal of the city to be affixed to the same.
And be it further enacted, That every physician, surgeon or apothecary, who shall sell, or
cause to be sold, remedies or drugs, which shall be proved to have been, at the time of selling
the same, injured, moulded [sic], discomposed [sic], or sophisticated, shall, on conviction,
forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars, to the benefit of the hospital of the poor of
New-Orleans.
And it be further enacted, That no physician, surgeon or apothecary, shall sell, give, or in
any way, directly or indirectly, part with any suspicious or dangerous remedy, but on
application in writing of heads of families of good reputation.—And it shall be the duty of said
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Act,” “require[d] a diploma and an examination before permitting pharmacists to
dispense drugs.”165 More importantly, the New Orleans Act prohibited unlicensed
practitioners from collecting fees,166 a provision which certainly would have
dampened the spirits of charlatans looking to make easy money by selling fraudulent
medicines. Thus, on its face, the New Orleans Act supports the Abigail court’s
conclusion that governmental regulation of drug safety is deeply rooted in American
history and traditions.
The New Orleans Act, however, did not grow from American culture and
tradition but from its Franco-Spanish tradition.167 Louisiana did not become an
American territory until 1804, just four years before the passage of the New Orleans
Act.168 Eighteenth-century French and Spanish legal traditions influenced the early
development of drug regulation in American Louisiana and the passing of the 1804
New Orleans Act, 169 which world-renowned pharmacy historian David L. Cowen
called “by far the outstanding enactment in the history of pharmaceutical
legislation.”170
Eighty years before the U.S. annexed Louisiana, French officials passed a law
that mirrored the 1808 law.171 It is likely that the 1723 French law was a precursor
heads of families, in said application in writing, to state for what use said remedy is wanted,
the day on which said remedy was delivered, and receive [sic] the name, the quality, and the
quantity of said remedy. Said application in writing shall be the only means of defence [sic]
allowed to the seller, in case said remedy should have been made use of with evil design; and
should the seller prove unable to exhibit such a writing for his discharge, he shall be deprived
of the exercise of his profession, and shall forfeit and pay the sum of one thousand dollars, to
the benefit of the hospital of New-Orleans.
ACTS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SECOND LEGISLATURE OF THE TERRITORY OF
ORLEANS (New Orleans, 1808), at 24-31, quoted in David L. Cowen, America’s First
Pharmacy Laws, 3 J. OF THE AM. PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOC. 162-63 (1942).
165
166

Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704.

See RUDOLPH MATAS, HISTORY
State Univ. 1958).

OF

MEDICINE

IN

LOUISIANA 332 (John Duffy ed., La.

167

Id. at 64. From the days of early settlement, French officials engaged in “zealous
supervision” of drugs, hospital facilities, and medical personnel, an enthusiasm reflected in
French Louisiana laws. Id.
168
Id. at xv-xvi. The area that is today Louisiana had been a French territory from 1699 to
1768, and had been a Spanish colony from 1769 to 1803. Id.
169

See id. at 330 (stating that “the long tradition of regulation under the French and
Spanish governments was bound to have had considerable influence” in early American
attempts to regulate medicine in Louisiana); but see Cowen, supra note 164, at 219
(cautioning against assuming that Louisiana’s preeminence in the field for medical regulation
should be ascribed to its Franco-Spanish tradition, because “at least ten of the twenty-six
individuals associated with drug shops in 1822 New Orleans had last names that were not of
French or Spanish origin,” and there is evidence that in the early 1800s “the medical
profession in Louisiana was rather disreputable”).
170
In Memoriam, DAVID L. COWEN, MEDICAL HISTORY SOCIETY OF NEW JERSEY,
http://www.mhsnj.org/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2007); see also David L. Cowen, Louisiana,
Pioneer in the Regulation of Pharmacy, in LA. HIST. QUART. 331 (1943).
171
See MATAS, supra note 166, at 64. In 1723, Louisiana’s Superior Council became
alarmed that “several ignorant persons were giving remedies and performing operations in
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of the 1808 New Orleans Act, because the “relatively strong controls which French
authorities had established over medical practice during the first half of the
eighteenth century were continued and strengthened under the Spanish regime.”172
Louisiana also boasts what is likely the earliest American law designed to regulate
drug quality.173 The law was the prototype of the New Orleans Act,174 but was only
one of many Spanish laws that reflected a strong Spanish commitment to the
regulation of drugs.175 It is no wonder that in the area of drug regulation, Louisiana
was far ahead of every other American state at the beginning of the nineteenth
century.176
Louisiana’s preeminence in this field would not last long under American rule.
In 1816, the state passed a law repealing the New Orleans Act and made no new
provision to prohibit the sale of drugs.177 According to John Duffy, “[n]either the
apothecaries nor the public apparently favored any such regulations, and a wide field
was opened for unethical and unscrupulous individuals to profit at the expense of the
sick.”178 In 1820, the American tradition of self-medication made its way into
Louisiana law when the legislature permitted unlicensed persons to sell “medicines
which shall have been purchased from any legal apothecary, and which have been
plainly labeled by said apothecary.”179 While this law certainly regulated drugs, it
did so by requiring that they be labeled,180 a tactic that would have made it easier for
the average citizen to choose his preferred medication.
By 1820, the American spirit of laissez-faire drug regulation had seemingly
displaced the Franco-Spanish traditions, but the devolvement was not then
complete.181 The most telling evidence of this shift in traditions is that in 1852
Louisiana succumbed to the American tradition and finally repealed all medical
New Orleans as well as the country.” Id. at 64. The council responded by declaring that
unlicensed practitioners were “forbidden to meddle in the arts of medicine or surgery on
penalty of being prosecuted by the Attorney General and punished with death.” Id.
172

Id. at 173.

173
Cowen, supra note 170, at 331. Promulgated February 12, 1770 by Don Alexandre
O’Reilly, Louisiana’s Spanish governor, the edict declared that, “[s]urgeons shall be always
ready to open and show to the physician the place where they keep their remedies so that they
may be inspected and thrown out if they are bad.” Id. The decree also forbade quackery by
providing that “[a]ll pretended healers, who are not provided with documents and certificates,
will be punished with imprisonment and arbitrary punishment if they are caught abusing the
credulity of the people.” MATAS, supra note 166, at 178.
174

MATAS, supra note 166, at 178.

175

Id. at 186-92.

176

Cowen, supra note 170, at 330.

177

John Duffy, Pharmacy in Franco-Spanish America, in AMER. PHARMACY IN THE
COLONIAL AND REVOL. PERIODS 15, 24-25 (George A. Bender & John Parascandola ed., Amer.
Inst. of the History of Pharm., 1976).
178

See MATAS, supra note 163, at 342.

179

See Cowen, supra note 167, at 334.

180

Id.

181

See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 214.
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legislation.182 According to Cowen, this devolution demonstrated “Louisiana’s
assimilation of the culture pattern of the rest of the country…[f]or the repeal of the
legislation in 1852 came not from conditions peculiar to Louisiana, but from
conditions characteristic of the entire American scene.”183 If anything, the 1808 New
Orleans Act marked the highpoint of the Franco-Spanish tradition and does not
accurately reflect the American tradition of drug regulation. The Abigail court’s
reference to the law therefore misrepresented the historical reality that the New
Orleans Act reflected Franco-Spanish traditions, not laissez-faire American attitudes.
3. A Short Survey of State Regulations
Although by 1870 many American states and territories had passed drug
regulations, it does not necessarily follow that such regulations were designed to
ensure drug safety. The 1736 Virginia Act is merely an example of the various laws
states passed to regulate the profession of pharmacy itself, not the access to unsafe
drugs.184 Meanwhile, the historical context surrounding the New Orleans Act
illustrates the American tradition of self-medication, as well as the government’s
accommodation of those who sold drugs without licenses.185 To be sure, the

182

Id.

183

Cowen, supra note 170, at 339.

184

The Virginia Act “reflects the attitude of London physicians of this period toward the
medical ambitions of the apothecaries.” KREMERS, supra note 34, at 159. The law grew from
a territorial dispute in which physicians sought to maintain status by differentiating themselves
from the growing number of apothecaries, who had limited education but who were
nonetheless permitted to dispense drugs. The “Act for regulating fees and accounts”
recognized the relative importance of the different professions by stamping each with specific
rates associated with their differing levels of education. Id.
185
The Abigail court noted that in 1817 South Carolina introduced legislation requiring
the licensing of pharmacists. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704. To be sure, South
Carolina was the first of the American colonies to require pharmacists to pass examinations
(1818) and to require apothecaries to obtain their licenses by applying to the state’s medical
society or board of physicians. See KREMERS, supra note 34, at 184. The 1817 Act contained
a fatal flaw, however, at least from the point of view of those who assumed that the act was
designed to eliminate the sale of medicines by non-professionals. It declared “[t]hat nothing
herein contained, be construed to prevent merchants or shop-keepers from vending or
exposing to sale medicines already prepared.” Cowen, supra note 164, at 166. Thus, while
the South Carolina law required examinations and licensing of pharmacists and apothecaries,
it did not preclude the common man from entering a shop and choosing the medication he felt
was necessary to cure his ailments. In fact, the South Carolina legislation was intended to
regulate the practice of medicine, not to curb the availability of drugs to the common man.
Moreover, twenty years later, this legislation was further emasculated. In 1838, South
Carolina repealed all of the penalty provisions relating to both pharmacists and apothecaries—
which essentially eviscerated the entire legislation. Id. In 1825, Georgia passed a statute that
closely tracked the language of the South Carolina Act passed in 1817. Id. at 167. Entitled,
“An Act to regulate licensing of Physicians to practice in this state,” the act permitted
physicians to sell drugs, required apothecaries to be licensed by the state, and prohibited
“[m]erchants, shop keepers and all other persons from compounding and preparing drugs and
medicines, or either.” Id. It is clear then, that the Georgia Act was designed to prohibit the
manufacture of drugs by anyone other than a licensed professional. Eleven years later,
however, Georgia repealed all of the penalty provisions of the 1825 act. Id. Although in 1839
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language of the various state acts must be read in context and their terms understood
within the purposes of the various acts.
The Abigail court failed to recognize this need to examine the particulars of each
act.186 It stated that “[b]y 1870, at least twenty-five American states or territories had
statutes regulating drug adulteration (impure drugs), and a few others had laws
addressing poisons.”187 While this statement appears to support the court’s overall
conclusion regarding drug safety regulation, it in fact reveals the court’s failure to
recognize the intricacies and purposes of each of the twenty-five laws to which it
referred.188 For example, when it defined “drug adulteration” as the fabrication of
“impure drugs,” the Abigail court implied that the twenty-five states barred the
production of inherently dangerous drugs.189 The word “impure” does not strictly
mean dangerous, but it connotes danger, particularly when it is associated with the
consumption of medications.190 As we shall see, the term “adulterated”191 as used in
government drug regulations typically referred to drugs whose impurity has rendered
them largely ineffective or inert, a quality that made them dangerous192 in that they
and 1847 the state declared the Georgia Act to be in full force, it did not also reinstate laws
that prohibited the practice of Thompsonian medicine. Id. Thompsonian medicine was
premised on the idea that every man could be his own physician. See YOUNG, supra note 58, at
54.
186

For the purposes of this paper, an exhaustive examination of each statute cited by the
court is not necessary. The Virginia and New Orleans acts illustrate the Abigail court’s failure
to examine closely the laws it cited to support its conclusion. See supra Sections IV.B.1-2.
Moreover, that the court’s facile construction of the word “adulterated” strongly implies
danger demonstrates its failure to scrutinize the language of the various acts. See infra Section
IV.B.3.
187

Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704.

188

The Abigail court cited the work of Edward Kremers and George Urdang with regard
to these twenty-five laws. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703-04; see also supra note 34.
This author’s research into the sources used by Kremers and Urdang did not confirm the
court’s assertion.
189

See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704.

190

Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines “impure” as inter alia, “containing
something unclean.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/impure (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
191

The 1828 edition of Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language defines
“adulterated” as “[c]orrupted; debased by a mixture with something of less value.” Webster’s
1828 Dictionary, CORNERSTONE BAPTIST TEMPLE, http://www.cbtministries.org/resources/
webster1828.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (emphasis added); Merriam-Webster’s
contemporary online dictionary defines “adulterate” as “to corrupt, debase, or make impure by
the addition of a foreign or inferior substance or element; especially : to prepare for sale by
replacing more valuable with less valuable or inert ingredients.” Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/adulterated (last visited Nov. 30, 2007) (emphasis
added). Therefore, the term did not merely mean dangerously “impure,” but that which has
been made less effective by corruption.
192
The danger associated with purchasing cheap drugs was that patients would forego
more reliable medical treatment. If the patient’s condition worsened while on the inadequate
treatment, it might become too late to administer life-saving medical therapy. See H.R. Rep.
No. 30-664, at 20 (1848) (stating that physicians in the Mexican War administered “herculean
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gave false hope to unsuspecting consumers who bought cheap, useless drugs from
“quacks”193 in their efforts to self-medicate.
In any event, “under the double impact of the growth of medical laissez-faire and
of the Civil War,” state laws regulating access to drugs became dead letters on the
books.194 In fact, a survey of state pharmaceutical laws found that by 1931, twentythree states had no restrictions on the sale of patent medicines by “general
merchants”—that is, “anyone permitted to sell drugs and medicines who [was] not a
registered pharmacist or assistant pharmacist.”195 Furthermore, only three states—
Colorado, Mississippi, and Nebraska—absolutely prohibited such sales.196 Given the
relatively lax state regulations of pharmacy, it would be difficult to conclude, as the
Abigail court seems to have done,197 that states maintained a strong commitment to
regulating drug safety even by the time of the early twentieth century.
C. Federal Regulations
It was not until 1938 that Congress passed any federal legislation regulating drug
safety.198 The Abigail court, however, characterized three federal drug regulations as
laws designed to prevent access to unsafe drugs—the Import Drug Act of 1848, the
Biologics Controls Act of 1902, and the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.199 While
the court accurately described the Biologics Control Act as a safety regulation, it
failed to consider the purpose behind it, which was to ensure that vaccinations being
forced on American citizens were in fact safe.200 Indeed, that act had little to do with
personal choice.201 Meanwhile, the court failed to recognize the peculiar language of
the Import Drug Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act, neither of which prohibited
portions of active medicines” of adulterated drugs purchased abroad). That such large
portions of drugs had to be administered demonstrates the danger of adulterated drugs. The
concern with such a danger as associated with fraud is evident in the variety of state laws
dealing with drug adulteration. For example, by 1858, Tennessee law penalized any
adulteration of drugs that would render the drugs less effective and thus dangerous to health.
In fact, various states prohibited fraudulent adulteration, which would render drugs harmful.
In 1839 and 1844, Vermont and Rhode Island each respectively passed such prohibitions. See
Sonnedecker, supra note 125, at 97.
193

Worling, supra note 75, at 60.

194

KREMERS, supra note 34, at 215.

195

Id.

196
See Robert P. Fischelis, A Survey of State Pharmacy Laws with Reference to the Sale of
Drugs and Medicines by General Merchants, in AM. PHARM. ASSOC. 1331, 1333-38 (Dec.
1931).
197

See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704.

198

See The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938); see also
YOUNG, supra note 129, at 12.
199

See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704.

200

See Henning Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that
the state may exercise its police power to mandate forced vaccinations because they are part of
a wholesome practice of ensuring the public welfare).
201

Id.
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the sale of dangerous drugs.202 In fact, these two laws are better characterized as
attempts to provide consumer information to those choosing medications for
themselves.203 Any regulation of drug safety under these two laws seems to have
been an incidental effect subordinated to the larger purpose of achieving greater
economic reliability for consumers.204
1. The Import Drug Act of 1848
In 1848, Congress passed the Import Drug Act.205 The Import Drug Act was the
federal government’s first attempt to regulate drugs and was passed because by 1848
the U.S. had become a virtual dumping ground for international adulterated drugs.206
In noting this disturbing trend, the Abigail court inferred a sense of alarm among
Americans and Congress at the increasing presence of such drugs by 1848.207
Therefore, the court cited the Import Drug Act as though Congress had designed it to
halt the importation of all inherently dangerous drugs.208 The Import Drug Act itself
and its legislative history, however, tell another story. That is, Congress passed it to
protect consumers, who deserved to get their money’s worth when buying
international drugs.209
Certainly, Section I of the Import Drug Act provided that the American customhouse would examine and appraise all medicines and drugs arriving at U.S. ports.210
202

See infra text accompanying notes 201-243.

203

Id.

204

Id.

205

Import Drug Act, 30th Cong., ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237 (1848). The law was entitled “An Act
to prevent the Importation of adulterated and spurious Drugs and Medicines. Id.
206
See Heath, supra note 126, at 169, 171-72. European countries such as France and
England had already passed laws designed to curb the importation of such medicines;
therefore, more and more adulterated drugs reached American shores. See Alex Berman,
Drug Control in Nineteenth-Century France: Antecedents and Directions, in SAFEGUARDING
THE PUBLIC: HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF MEDICINAL DRUG CONTROL at 9 (John B. Blake ed.,
Johns Hopkins Press 1970) (noting that in the early nineteenth century, France promulgated
national laws to eradicate adulterated drugs); see also H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 4, 9
(recognizing London as the largest drug market in the world in 1848, and asserting that
because of long-standing British laws against adulteration, England was likely shipping its
inferior drugs to the U.S.).
207

See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 704.

208

Id. at 704. The court stated that the Act “banned ‘imported adulterated drugs’ after a
Congressional committee concluded that ‘this country had become the grand mart and
receptacle of all the refuse [drugs] . . . not only from the European warehouses, but from the
whole Eastern world.’” Id. Although the court quoted Heath, the Committee language
appears in H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 3 (1848). Id. (quoting Heath, supra note 126, at 175).
209
See Angela Walch, A Spurious Solution to a Genuine Problem: An In-Depth Look at
the Import Drugs Act of 1848, at 29, available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/
448/Walch.pdf.
210

Import Drug Act, supra note 205. The Act states in pertinent part:

[A]ll drugs, medicines, medicinal preparations, including medicinal essential oils, and
chemical preparations used wholly or in part as medicine, imported into the United
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The Import Drug Act, however, limited the examination and appraisal to an
assessment of their “quality, purity, and fitness for medical purposes, as to their
value and identity specified in the invoice.”211 A close reading of the act reveals that
the “quality, purity, and fitness” of the drugs did not refer to any dangers that might

States from abroad, shall, before passing the custom-house, be examined and
appraised, as well in reference to their quality, purity, and fitness for medical
purposes, as to their value and identity specified in the invoice.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That all medicinal preparations, whether
chemical or otherwise, usually imported with the name of the manufacturer, shall have
the true name of the manufacturer, and the place where they are prepared, permanently
and legibly affixed to each parcel, by stamp, label, or otherwise; and all medicinal
preparations imported without such names affixes as aforesaid, shall be adjudged to be
forfeited.
SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That if, on examination, any drugs, medicines,
medicinal preparations, whether chemical or otherwise, including medicinal essential
oils, are found, in the opinion of the examiner, to be so far adulterated, or in any
manner deteriorated, as to render them inferior in strength and purity to the standard
established by the United States, Edinburgh, London, French, and German
pharmacopoeias and dispensatories, and thereby improper, unsafe, or dangers to be
used for medicinal purposes, a return to that effect shall be made upon the invoice, and
the articles so noted shall not pass the custom-house, unless, on reexamination of a
strictly analytical character, called for by the owner or consignee, the return of the
examiner shall be found erroneous; and it shall be declared as the result of such
analysis, that the said articles may properly, safely, and without danger, be used for
medicinal purposes.
SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That the owner or consignee shall at all times,
when dissatisfied with the examiner’s return, have the privilege of calling, at his own
expense, for a reexamination; and, on depositing with the collector such sum as the
latter may deem sufficient to defray such expense, it shall be the duty of that officer to
procure some competent analytical chemist possessing the confidence of the medical
profession, as well as of the colleges of medicine and pharmacy, if any such
institutions exist in the State in which the collection district is situated, a careful
analysis of the articles included in said return, and a report upon the same under oath;
and in case the report, which shall be final, shall declare the return of the examiner to
be erroneous, and the said articles to be of the requisite strength and purity, according
to the standards referr3ed to in the next preceding section orf this act, the entire
invoice shall be passed without reservation, on payment of the customary duties; but,
in case the examiner’s return shall be sustained by the analysis and report, the said
articles shall remain in charge of the collector, and the owner or consignee, on
payment of the charges of storage, and other expenses necessarily incurred by the
United States, shall have the privilege of reexporting them at any time within the six
months after the report of the analysis; but if the said articles shall not be sent out of
the United States within the time specified, it shall be the duty of the collector, at the
expiration of said time, to cause the same to be destroyed, holding the owner or
consignee responsible to the United States for payment of all charges, in the same
manner as if said articles had been reexported.
Id.
211

Id. at § 1 (emphasis added).

2008]

DYING TO WAIT: HOW THE ABIGAIL COURT GOT IT WRONG

79

be inherent in drugs.212 Instead, the phrase referred specifically to their economic
valuation and their identification as reflected in the invoice accompanying the
drugs.213
To be sure, the words “strength and purity” reflect Congress’s apparent intent to
exclude those drugs which were chemically ineffectual or laden with chemically
inert materials,214 so that American consumers could know how effective the drugs
and medicines would be215 when they self-medicated.216 Congress would have been
aware that the strength of a drug could be diminished by long storage or exposure to
the elements and might therefore become deteriorated to the point of inertness.217
Meanwhile, a drug’s purity could be degraded by inert fillers like vegetable matter,
clay, sand, and water.218 Consequently, a drug’s value could be manipulated
dramatically without the requisite price adjustment on the shipping invoice, upon
which the seller would nevertheless demand the price commensurate with
unadulterated drugs.219 Indeed, a close reading of H.R. Rep. No. 30-664 reveals that
it was such sharp practices that were the target of the Import Drug Act.220 In short, it
appears Congress designed this section of the Import Drug Act to prevent entry
through U.S. ports of those drugs which, in fact, did not meet the professed
specifications under which they were sold.221 Those drugs which failed to meet the
standards professed were thereby considered ineligible for importation.222

212

Id.

213

Id.

214

See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 7 (1848); see also Walch, supra note 209, at 28.

215

See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 2 (1848).

216

See supra Part III.

217

See Omudhome Ogbru, What You Should Know About Drugs, http://www.medicine
net.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=16667 (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
218

See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 7 (1848).

219

Id. at 11; see also Walch, supra 209, at 30 (stating that although the Committee noted
that deteriorated, ineffectual drugs were often sold at a lower price than that charged for purer
products, the Committee was outraged that such materials could be sold at all to an
unsuspecting public that bought the cheaper drugs in reliance of promises that they would
have some medicinal effect).
220

See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 9-13 (1848). The general tenor of the report can be
summed up by the words of the doctor commissioned to report on the problem of adulterated
foreign drugs which stated:
Many of the foreign medicinal extracts are prepared and sold in reference to price
rather than strength and purity. The foreign manufacturers prepare any quality called
for. Compound extract of colocynth (as the label imports) comes to us in a manner
well calculated to deceive, but, on examination, is found to contain not one particle of
colocynth.
Id. at 11.
221

See Sonnedecker, supra note 41, at 28-29.

222

Import Drug Act, supra note 205.
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An examination of Section III of the Import Drug Act also reveals that
Congress’s primary goal was to prevent misrepresentation of the value of drugs and
medicines.223 American consumers could therefore know how effective the drugs
and medicines would be when they self-medicated. Section III of the Import Drug
Act provided that drugs and medicines would not clear customs if they were “so far
adulterated, or in any manner deteriorated, as to render them inferior in strength and
purity to the standard established by the United States, Edinburgh, London, French,
and German pharmacopoeias224 and dispensatories, and thereby improper, unsafe, or
dangerous to be used for medicinal purposes.”225
The word “adulterated” is susceptible to various interpretations, but the meaning
Congress ascribed to it in the Import Drug Act seems to reflect Congress’s
preoccupation with consumer protection, not patient protection.226 Congress
assigned the term a broader meaning than that which the Abigail court ascribed to it
when it described adulterated drugs merely as “impure,” a word that allows the facile
inference that the Import Drug Act was designed primarily to exclude drugs that
were contaminated with inherently dangerous ingredients.227 A close reading of
Section III reveals, however, that the word “adulterated” referred to those drugs and
medicines which were so “inferior in strength and purity” that they did not meet the
efficacy standards of the various international pharmacopoeias.228 In fact, the statute
states that by not meeting these standards of strength and purity, the drugs were
“thereby improper, unsafe, or dangerous to be used for medicinal purposes,”229 not
that their quality was inherently dangerous.230 Therefore, rather than a law designed
to ensure the inherent safety of drugs, the Import Drug Act appears to have been
designed to ensure the efficacy of drugs so that consumers would know whether they
were getting their money’s worth. As such, the law gives little support to the Abigail

223

Id.; see also Walch, supra note 209 at 29 (stating that page after page of the House
Committee’s Report describes the importation of many worthless drugs, and averring that the
Committee was concerned particularly with protecting Americans from paying high prices for
worthless drugs).
224

In 1820, physicians and pharmacists convened at the United States Pharmacopeial
Convention. HARRY F. DOWLING, MEDICINES FOR MAN: THE DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION,
AND USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 139 (Knopf 1970). In an effort to set standards by which
they could determine whether particular drugs were pure and effective, they published a set of
standards which have become the basis for several federal laws. Id.
225

Import Drug Act, supra note 205, at § 3 (emphasis added).

226

See Walch, supra note 209, at 29 (stating that “economic concerns, rather than the
safety, of the American people were persuasive to Congress.”).
227

The Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines “impure” as inter alia, “containing
something unclean.”
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impure
(last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
228

See Import Drug Act, supra note 205, at § 3 (emphasis added).

229

Id.

230

See Sonnedecker, supra note 41, at 28-30 (emphasis added).

2008]

DYING TO WAIT: HOW THE ABIGAIL COURT GOT IT WRONG

81

court’s stilted conclusion that the Import Drug Act represents the federal
government’s intent to regulate drug safety in nineteenth-century America.
2. The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906
In 1906, Congress passed and President Theodore Roosevelt signed, the Pure
Food and Drugs Act, also known as the Wiley Act.231 In describing the Wiley Act,
the Abigail court mischaracterized its purpose and effect when it stated that Congress
“passed the Food and Drugs Act of 1906, which prohibited the manufacture of any
drug that was ‘adulterated.’”232 The court mischaracterized the Wiley Act as a drug
safety regulation, when, in the words of James Harvey Young, the law actually
“provided only modest controls of self-dosage medications.”233 In short, Congress
passed the Wiley Act to protect consumers from fraud or misrepresentation. Rather
than being concerned about drug safety, Congress sought to “ensure that fair value
was received for money spent.”234
The Wiley Act prohibited the manufacture and interstate trade of “adulterated”
drugs.235 It also prescribed, however, a particular meaning for the term “adulterated”
that the Abigail court failed to recognize.236 The Wiley Act set out two definitions
for “adulterated.”237 First, it stated that no drug “defined in the United States
Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary shall be deemed to be adulterated under this
provision if the standard of strength, quality, or purity be plainly stated upon the
bottle, box, or other container thereof although the standard may differ from that
determined by the test laid down in the United States Pharmacopoeia or National
Formulary.”238 Thus, a drug defined by the official pharmacopoeia could be of
inferior “strength, quality, or purity,” but its packaging would have to disclose that
fact.239 If it did so, the drug would not be considered “adulterated”240 and could be
manufactured and even transported interstate.241 Second, the Wiley act stated that a
drug would not be “adulterated” unless its “strength or purity [fell] below the
231
See Pure Food and Drugs Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906); see also YOUNG, supra note 129, at
12. The Wiley Act was named after Dr. Harvey Wiley, head of the Bureau of Chemistry of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Wiley was a staunch advocate of pure food and drugs laws
and is credited for leading the movement that led to the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906.
See HERBERT BURKHOLZ, THE FDA FOLLIES 7-8 (Basicbooks 1994).
232

Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 705.

233

YOUNG, supra note 129, at 12.

234

PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION
(Harvard Press 1980).
235

IN THE

UNITED STATES 4

Pure Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 at § 2 (1906).

236

See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 705; see also Pure Food and Drugs Act ch. 3915, 34
Stat. 768 at § 7 (1906).
237

Pure Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 at § 7 (1906).

238

Id. (emphasis added).

239

Sonnedecker, supra note 41, at 37.

240

See Pure Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 at § 7.

241

See id. at § 2; see also Sonnedecker, supra note 41, at 37.
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professed standard or quality under which it [was] sold,”242 a provision that referred
to drugs not covered by the two pharmacopoeias mentioned above.243 As a result,
any drug not officially recognized by the two pharmacopoeias would be considered
unadulterated and could therefore be manufactured, transported, and sold as long as
the seller did not misrepresent the value of the drug.244 In short, the term
“adulterated” as used in the Wiley Act did not mean “dangerous” or even “impure,”
which was the superficial definition assigned to it by the Abigail court.245
The Wiley Act did little to regulate access to drugs because it was not designed to
do so.246 It is unlikely, however, that the Abigail court recognized this fact when it
deemed the Act one of the “early examples of federal government intervention.”247
The federal government certainly intervened, but it did so to prevent fraud and
misrepresentation; it did not do so to prevent access to unsafe drugs. While it did
require disclosure of potentially dangerous substances, the Wiley Act did not “strike
a blow against self-medication, but sought to make it safer.”248
3. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 and its 1962 Kefauver-Harris
Amendments
As noted above, Congress passed the first federal law regulating drug safety in
1938, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.249 Although the 1938 law did not
regulate the efficacy of drugs,250 the new powers it bestowed on government agencies
were far-reaching.251 The new law provided four new safeguards when it: 1)
commanded the use of prescriptions,252 2) required that drugs be labeled with
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described the situation succinctly when he said that “to avoid the scope of the law entirely, [a
manufacturer] could produce a nonnarcotic preparation, give it a novel name, and say little
definite about it.” TEMIN, supra note 234, at 30.
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directions for safe use, 3) removed the scienter requirement for proving false
therapeutic claims, and 4) mandated that all drugs be deemed safe before they could
be marketed.253 Of note, the final provision regarding drug safety was introduced
late into the proposed legislation for the 1938 law.254 That Congress included this
crucial provision as a virtual afterthought reveals the federal government’s
ambiguous approach to drug safety regulation even in 1938 when it passed the first
“safety” regulation.255 Still, the new controls were stringent256 relative to those laid
out in the corpus of laissez-faire drug laws that had flourished since the early days of
American settlement.257 In effect, the 1938 law was the first American law that
could be called a drug safety regulation affecting the discretion Americans had long
enjoyed when choosing medications. The law’s new restrictions were such that
James Harvey Young said, “self-medication was doomed.”258
On October 10, 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the
1938 law.259 These amendments compelled drug makers to operate under procedures
prescribed by the FDA and required that factories submit to inspections, present
plans for prospective clinical trials, and continuously monitor the effects of their
drugs on patients.260 In effect, the amendments strengthened dramatically the FDA’s
control over the regulation of drug manufacturing.
The 1962 amendments were the first federal regulations that purported261 to
require drug manufacturers to make a substantial showing that their drugs were
FDA now requires before experimental drugs may be marketed once they pass the final phase
of testing. Also, in 1936 Ruth De Forest published her book The American Chamber of
Horrors, which detailed the pervasiveness of useless and “dangerous” foods, cosmetics, and
drugs.
See ROBERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OF THE
MARKETPLACE 24 (Twayne Publ. 1989). The book caused a public outcry, which pushed
Congress to enact the 1938 law. Id.
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efficacious, not merely safe.262 This efficacy requirement prompted the Abigail court
to state correctly, if tritely, that “even setting the safety issue to one side…, as a
matter of history, at least some drug regulation prior to 1962 addressed efficacy.”263
The court failed, however, to elucidate on the question of why ensuring drug efficacy
has historically been an important government interest. Its treatment ignores the fact
that the history of drug regulation in the U.S. has been tied to the tradition of selfmedication and the desire to protect consumers’ pocketbooks, not their health.264
Congress’s requirement that drug makers make a substantial showing that their
drugs be effective suggests strongly that the 1962 law was also rooted in a desire to
protect market consumers. According to Louis Lasagna, the committee hearings
leading up to the passage of the 1962 law appeared to be primarily concerned with
“excessive drug costs, inadequate competition, price control, and patent
protections.”265 Robert N. Mayer adds that, “the amendments were primarily
designed to save dollars, not lives.”266 If Lasagna and Mayer are correct, then the
efficacy requirement was largely an extension of a tradition within which the
government had long engaged—that is, the regulation of drugs with the intent to
protect consumers from fraud or misrepresentation.267 Therefore, the Abigail court
was correct in stating that the government has long regulated the efficacy of drugs,
but its intimation that it did so to ensure the safety of drugs has little support from
history. In fact, the court’s words reflect its misunderstanding of our country’s
history and traditions regarding the consumption and regulation of medicines.
V. THE PROPOSAL
On January 14, 2008, the United States Supreme Court declined the Abigail
Alliance’s petition for a writ of certiorari.268 By doing so, the Court failed to address
the circuit split269 over which test courts should apply when determining whether a
particular liberty interest is deeply rooted in our country’s history and tradition.270
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By denying certiorari, the Court has also declined to address the circuit split over
whether Lawrence v. Texas has superseded Glucksberg v. Washington with regard to the test
the Court will consider when determining that a particular liberty interest is not deeply rooted
in our country’s history and tradition. To be sure, Lawrence has called into question the
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More apropos of this paper, the Court declined to answer the salient question of
whether terminally ill patients with no medical alternatives have a fundamental right
of access to experimental drugs that have been deemed safe enough by Phase I
investigative trials to continue human testing. This refusal leaves in place a deeply
flawed precedent.
To be sure, the Abigail court’s mischaracterization of history reveals that its
approach was almost wholly devoid of historical analysis. Because it ignored this
country’s history of self-medication and disregarded its duty to scrutinize the laws it
cited in support of its decision, the Abigail court found no deeply-rooted tradition of
access to experimental drugs. In short, because of its misappropriation of history,
the Abigail court rendered a conclusion perfectly contrary to reality. Had the
Supreme Court chosen to review this nation’s true history under the Glucksberg
test,271 it would have found that access to experimental drugs had been an institution
that for centuries was “deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition.”272 This
finding would have opened the door to further constitutional analysis and the

Supreme Court’s analysis set out in Glucksberg. See generally Hawkins, supra note 269. In
Lawrence, the Court held that the Due Process Clause grants consenting adults a liberty right
to be free of government interference into homosexual sodomy practiced within the privacy of
their own homes. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). More importantly, for
purposes of the issue at hand, the Court concluded that this country’s recent history with
regard to attitudes toward homosexuality weighed more heavily than the purported longstanding tradition of anti-homosexual sentiment. Id. at 559. Therefore, the Court concluded
that “laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance” when determining
whether the liberty interest in Lawrence should be given substantive constitutional protection.
Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that many states in the latter half of the
twentieth-century had repealed anti-sodomy laws as well as laws banning homosexual sex in
general. Id. The Court interpreted this as a jurisprudential shift that reflected “emerging
awareness” that certain liberties indeed exist. Id.
Given the Court’s analysis in Lawrence, it is possible that courts faced with the issue
presented here will eschew the test in Glucksberg for Lawrence’s “emerging awareness”
analysis. If so, such courts may find that terminally ill patients have no fundamental right of
access to experimental drugs because the federal government has clearly established safety
regulations, which have been in place since 1938. It is important to note, however, that the
Lawrence Court did not subject the Texas statute under strict scrutiny, but instead a rational
basis scrutiny. Id. at 574. It merely found that the statute was irrational and arbitrary because
it singled out homosexuals and invaded their substantive due process rights. Id. at 578-79.
Yet, the Court stopped short of calling that right fundamental. More importantly, the Court
did not say that history is irrelevant. Id. at 572. Instead, it stated that “[h]istory and tradition
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
inquiry.” Id. Thus, rather than a repudiation of extended history, Lawrence appears to stand
for the proposition that courts may look to recent social developments to decide whether to
recognize the fundamental nature of a particular liberty interest. See generally Parshall, supra
note 269.
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A finding that self-medication and laissez-faire government regulation of drugs was a
deeply-rooted tradition of American history would not mean that the Abigail Alliance would
have met its burden of showing that access to experimental drugs is a fundamental right.
Whether a liberty interest rises to the level of a fundamental right involves a more complex
analysis. See Glucksberg, 117 U.S. at 720-721; see also infra Section V.
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prospect of subjecting FDA policies to strict scrutiny, a much higher standard than
the rational basis standard the Abigail court used to deny terminally ill patients with
no other alternatives a fundamental right of access to potentially life-saving drugs.
Of course, a finding that a particular liberty interest is “deeply-rooted” does not
dispose of the question of whether that interest merits constitutional protection.273
Under Glucksberg, once a court determines that a particular interest is “deeplyrooted,” it must then decide whether that interest is “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were
sacrificed.”274
Allowing terminally ill patients, such as Abigail, access to potentially life-saving
drugs is a right of liberty that is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”275 This
facet of the Glucksberg test, despite its seemingly distinctive nature, is in fact closely
related to the question of whether a liberty interest is “deeply rooted.” For example,
when the Glucksberg Court held that there is no fundamental right to assisted
suicide, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the government has throughout
American history banned, and continues to ban, assisted suicide.276 While the Court
recognized that a liberty interest in suicide may be characterized as a right “to define
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life,” 277 it stressed that the mere fact that “rights and liberties…sound in
personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are [fundamental rights].”278 Thus, the
Court recognized that a liberty interest is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
not because it involves personal autonomy deserving of protection from government
intrusion, but because it involves a personal liberty that is grounded in history and
tradition—a construction that supports the Abigail Alliance’s pursuit of access to
experimental drugs. To be sure, American history reflects a long tradition in which
Americans enjoyed personal access to drugs.279 More than that, Americans’ right of
self-medication was recognized and furthered by government regulations intended to
promote consumer confidence.280 As such, a court that establishes the fundamental
liberty the Abigail Alliance seeks would be recognizing a liberty interest in personal
autonomy, as well as the tradition that has for centuries supported this freedom.
Finally, under Glucksberg, the Abigail Alliance would also have to submit a
“careful description of the asserted fundamental interest” it seeks to establish.281
Although the Abigail court failed to reach this aspect of the Glucksberg test, the
court asserted that the Abigail Alliance would likely be unable to make such a
273

Id. at 721.

274

Id.

275

Id.

276

Id. at 728.

277

Id. at 726.

278

Id. at 727.

279

See supra Part III.

280

See supra Part IV.

281

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (internal quotations omitted).

2008]

DYING TO WAIT: HOW THE ABIGAIL COURT GOT IT WRONG

87

showing because access to experimental drugs would depend on the FDA’s
regulatory determinations regarding the drug’s safety and efficacy.282 The court
asked, “How can a constitutional right be defined by an administrative regulation
that is subject to change?”283 In addition, the court found it “difficult to imagine how
a right inextricably entangled with the details of shifting administrative regulations
could be deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”284
The Abigail court failed to recognize that fundamental interests such as the one
the Abigail Alliance seeks have been carefully described with regard to medical
experts’ evolving understanding of medicine and pharmacology. In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,285 the Supreme Court upheld Roe v. Wade286 and recognized
that a woman’s right to choose to abort a pre-viable fetus shall not be unduly
burdened by government interference.287 That the Casey Court did not grant an
absolute right to abortion288 is instructive. While it recognized the fundamental right
of access to an abortion, the Casey Court qualified that right by reference to medical
principles surrounding the viability of the fetus and concerns over the mother’s
health.289 In short, the government’s interests in potential life and in the mother’s
health are circumscribed by medical opinions regarding fetal viability and the health
of the mother.290 That doctors make such determinations is indicative of their role in
carefully describing the mother’s liberty interest in having an abortion.
The fundamental right the Abigail Alliance seeks to establish is similar to the
right recognized in Casey. That is, the right that terminally ill patients seek in
gaining access to experimental drugs is analogous to a woman’s right to choose
abortion under certain circumstances. It is important to note that the Abigail
Alliance does not advocate absolute access to all drugs not proven safe; it merely
seeks access to post-Phase I drugs that have been deemed sufficiently safe for
continued experimentation on humans. The determinations that the FDA’s medical
experts make with regard to a drug’s safety and efficacy are analogous to that which
medical experts make with regard to whether a woman’s request for an abortion is
medically advisable. More specifically, determinations over whether continued
human testing of post-Phase I drugs is advisable are analogous to determinations
over whether a fetus is viable, or whether a woman’s health will be inadvisably
compromised by an invasive abortion. Yet the fundamental right to governmentfettered access to an abortion is widely-recognized, while the patient who is
breathing her last breath is denied access to potentially life-saving post-Phase I
282
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drugs. Rather than resting on concerns surrounding patients’ health, it appears this
artificial distinction rests largely on administrative, bureaucratic, and economic
reasons having little to do with the impact that a carefully described right of access
might entail.291
The Abigail Alliance does not seek a liberty interest for the general public in
obtaining access to experimental drugs. Rather, it seeks to establish a liberty interest
for those terminally ill patients who have no life-saving alternatives and who consent
to consume post-Phase I experimental drugs.292 Like patients who seek abortions,
these patients would act under the direction of their personal physicians, who are
best-situated to make the determination that under the circumstances post-Phase I
experimental drugs are the best alternative to dying. Abigail’s doctor made that
determination for her.293 Had he had his way, she might be alive today.
Were a court to determine that the liberty interest the Abigail Alliance seeks is
fundamental, it would still need to decide whether the FDA policy is constitutional.
That is, it must strictly scrutinize the FDA’s denial of access to terminally ill patients
who seek to consume post-Phase I experimental drugs. Such an exercise would
entail greater effort and analysis than that displayed by the court in Abigail.
To determine the constitutionality of the FDA regulations, the court must
determine whether those policies are narrowly tailored to furthering a compelling
government interest.294 Of course, the court may find the policies pass such
constitutional muster by finding that the fundamental right of access to potentially
life-saving drugs must yield to the state’s interests in preserving public health.
Applying the Glucksberg test to the true history and tradition regarding selfmedication and the lack of drug safety regulations, however, would require a court to
make that difficult determination by weighing terminally ill patients’ weighty
interest in survival against the government’s interest in prohibiting this particular
group’s access to potential cures.
If the thrust of the FDA policy is to protect the general public health, then it
sweeps too broadly. The FDA has the alternative to narrow its prohibition on postPhase I experimental drugs to exclude those who are not both terminally ill and
willing to undergo post-Phase I clinical trials, which are regularly made available to
those patients the FDA has deemed suitable test subjects. That the FDA allows postPhase I drugs to be administered to willing test subjects demonstrates its willingness
to accept risks to patients who themselves knowingly assume the risks. As the
Abigail Alliance has stated, all that it seeks is a
right for terminally ill patients with no remaining treatment options to
fight for their own lives, by taking a drug that their doctors have
concluded is justified by the available scientific evidence and that the
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FDA itself would let them take if they were lucky or well-connected
enough to get a spot in the trial.295
This statement reflects the frustrations that patients, such as Abigail, feel when
they are denied access to a drug that is indeed being administered to human test
subjects. As Abigail’s failure to be accepted as a subject indicates,296 many patients
are understandably frustrated when they are excluded for reasons associated with a
drug’s marketability, not for an overweening concern for patient safety.
Finding that terminally ill patients have a fundamental right of access to
experimental drugs would not mean a return to the days of governmental laissezfaire regulation of drugs. The government surely maintains strong interests in
regulating the sale and ingestion of drugs generally. Its interests in regulating
narcotics are surely compelling and would outweigh the public’s interest in ingesting
such substances without strict oversight. Similarly, the government’s interests in
withholding access to experimental drugs would outweigh the general public’s right
of access to them. Absent the strong interest in self-preservation, the interest in
seeking access to experimental drugs would be outweighed by the government’s
concern for patient safety. Indeed, courts may justifiably deny such access even as
they recognize that terminally ill patients have a fundamental right of access to
potentially life-saving cures that have passed Phase-I of the FDA’s testing regime.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Abigail court declared that to prove its claim, the Abigail Alliance would
need to show “that there is a tradition of access to drugs that have not yet been
proven effective, but also a tradition of access to drugs that have not yet been proven
safe.”297 American history bears proof of both—that is, a cultural institution of selfmedication, as well as government’s accommodation and protection of that tradition.
American history reveals that British colonists came to America with a wealth of
personal medical knowledge, and the custom of medical self-treatment that had been
and would for long continue to be their tradition.298 Such traditions flourished in the
New World of frontier living, experimentation, and laissez-faire economics.
Meanwhile, the American laissez-faire attitude strengthened the belief that
Americans expected government would not interfere with their right to selfmedication. It is perhaps true, as the Abigail court noted, that the “lack of prior
governmental regulation of an activity tells us little about whether the activity merits
constitutional protection.”299 This statement assumes, however, that the Abigail
Alliance’s argument rests on the proposition that government assumed a completely
laissez-faire approach to drug regulation. It did not. For the greater part of
American history, government regulation of drugs rested on protectionist principles
and was designed to guard against charlatans who preyed on unsuspecting
Americans seeking potential cures. Early American state and federal governments
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often stepped in to regulate medical fees and drug costs because they recognized that
citizens regularly engaged in such choices. Therefore, the government’s laissez-faire
approach to drug regulation involved recognition of the right of self-medication.300
Drug safety regulation did not begin until 1938301 and any regulations dealing with
the efficacy of drugs were aimed at ensuring that Americans received fair value, that
is, that they did not pay for fraudulent therapeutic claims.302
Despite this unmistakable history, the Abigail court found no “deeply rooted”
tradition that would support the Abigail Alliance’s position. It is therefore ironic that
the court began its analysis by noting that, “the Supreme Court has directed courts to
exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.”303
In short, courts exploring the expansion of substantive due process rights must
exercise extraordinary caution. While it is natural for a court facing such a question
to be wary of the consequences that attend the recognition of substantive rights, the
caveat does not amount to a license to courts to abdicate their responsibility of
carefully analyzing the issue and the facts at hand.
In summary, the Abigail court’s holding was founded on faulty conclusions about
American history. A court reviewing the Abigail Alliance’s case under Glucksberg
must apply an accurate account of our nation’s history. By doing so, the court will
be able to find that there is a deeply-rooted tradition of self-medication and laissezfaire drug regulation in this country, and will then be able to proceed with the
appropriate constitutional analysis. Such an analysis would produce the conclusion
that a particular group of persons indeed has a fundamental right of access to
experimental drugs. These are terminally ill people who, having no life-saving
options, consent to consume post-Phase I experimental drugs under the care of
physicians trying to save their lives.
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presuppose that a right is historically rooted. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 706. This
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revealed government’s accommodating, laissez-faire policy toward drug safety regulation. See
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customers. See id. at Part IV. Thus, there is in the United States a long tradition of regulating
drugs with regard to their marketability, not their safety. In short, the Abigail court was wrong
to assume that there has been a lack of government drug regulation in general.
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